Courts, Legislatures, and Ballot Initiatives: How Policy Venue Affects Public Acceptance

31 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 18 Aug 2009

See all articles by Alison Gash

Alison Gash

University of Oregon

Michael Murakami

Georgetown University

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Is the public more supportive of policies when they are produced by a court, by a legislature, or by citizens voting on a ballot initiative? In particular, are court-produced prescriptions more unpopular precisely because they have emerged from anti-majoritarian institutions? Using an experimental survey, we find strong evidence that state-level policy venue does indeed color the way individuals perceive policies – largely in ways that flow from popular conceptions of democratic theory. Individuals are more likely to agree with, and less willing to work against, policies that have been produced by their fellow citizens. Meanwhile, they are least likely to support policies that have come from the courts. However, the effect of policy venue differs dramatically between self-identified partisans and Independents, suggesting that Independents may value the partisan neutrality of courts more than bemoan their antimajoritarian tendencies. These findings have important implications for public opinion scholars, pollsters, and policy entrepreneurs seeking to promote their agenda through these state-level venues.

Suggested Citation

Gash, Alison and Murakami, Michael, Courts, Legislatures, and Ballot Initiatives: How Policy Venue Affects Public Acceptance (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1450846

Alison Gash (Contact Author)

University of Oregon ( email )

1280 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States

Michael Murakami

Georgetown University ( email )

ICC, Suite 681
Washington, DC 20057-1034
United States

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