The Variable Effect of Congressional Competition on Incumbent Accountability: A Multilevel Model

34 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 1 Sep 2009

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

In a representative democracy, electoral incentives are supposed to facilitate political accountability and encourage legislators to be more responsive to their constituents' preferences. I examine whether voters sanction incumbents with whom they disagree by utilizing multilevel modeling techniques with data that directly capture whether a citizen agrees with the position his representative has taken across a wide range of policy debates. I find that incumbents are sanctioned by voters who disagree with their positions, but that sanctioning is stronger when electoral competition is robust and varies by the type of policy at stake.

Suggested Citation

Wichowsky, Amber, The Variable Effect of Congressional Competition on Incumbent Accountability: A Multilevel Model (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1451256

Amber Wichowsky (Contact Author)

Marquette University ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
60
Abstract Views
505
Rank
667,417
PlumX Metrics