Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance

“Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance.” In Journal of Conflict Resolution. 56, No. 6 (December 2012): 982-1016. (With Edmund Malesky)

36 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 20 Sep 2013

See all articles by Melani Cammett

Melani Cammett

Professor

Edmund J. Malesky

Duke University, Political Science

Date Written: July 18, 2012

Abstract

Which conditions do power-sharing governments rule more effectively? Adopting a disaggregated view of political power-sharing, we argue that certain components of political power-sharing are associated with better governance and duration of peace than others. In particular, countries that adopt closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems tend to have superior governance outcomes and, as a result, experience more enduring periods of post-conflict peace and stability. Characteristics of closed-list PR systems such as tight party discipline, which provides more checks on executive power, and reduced incentives for personalistic voting, may account for the positive relationship between this electoral system and superior governance and regime survival. The introduction of political institutions in post-conflict peace agreements allows us to test the independent effects of institutions on governance and stability using large-n analysis and carefully selected case studies.

Keywords: Power-sharing, Regime Survival, Governance, Proportional Representation, Cambodia, Croatia

Suggested Citation

Cammett, Melani and Malesky, Edmund J., Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance (July 18, 2012). “Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance.” In Journal of Conflict Resolution. 56, No. 6 (December 2012): 982-1016. (With Edmund Malesky). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1452036

Melani Cammett (Contact Author)

Professor ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Edmund J. Malesky

Duke University, Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

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