How does Party Fractionalization Convey Preferences for Redistribution in Parliamentary Democracies?

Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 21 Aug 2009

See all articles by Elvire Guillaud

Elvire Guillaud

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Bruno Amable

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne; National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives d'Economie Mathematique Appliquees a la Planification (CEPREMAP)

Donatella Gatti

PSE; Paris School of Economics (PSE); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Running regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries over 23 years, we consider the link between the demand for redistribution and social policy outcomes accounting for the party system. We investigate how the heterogeneity of the demand (distribution of preferences within countries) is translated into policy outcomes, according to the rules of the political game (number of parties). Our results show that a higher degree of party fractionalization enables the demand for redistribution to have a greater impact on the social policy actually implemented.

Keywords: political demand, party fractionalization, redistribution

JEL Classification: D78, H10, H53

Suggested Citation

Guillaud, Elvire and Amable, Bruno and Amable, Bruno and Gatti, Donatella and Gatti, Donatella, How does Party Fractionalization Convey Preferences for Redistribution in Parliamentary Democracies? (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1452098

Elvire Guillaud (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

106-112 boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris, 75013
France
+33 144 078 151 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/elvireguillaud/

Bruno Amable

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives d'Economie Mathematique Appliquees a la Planification (CEPREMAP) ( email )

Ecole Normale Superieure
48 boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

Donatella Gatti

PSE ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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