Nuclear Superiority or the Balance of Resolve? Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes

Abstract

What determines the outcome of nuclear crises? Scholars have long debated whether nuclear superiority or the balance of resolve shapes the probability of victory in nuclear brinkmanship settings, but have not clearly articulated the possible mechanisms linking superiority to victory, nor have they systematically analyzed the entire universe of empirical cases. Using a new dataset on fifty-six nuclear crises that includes information on nuclear arsenal size and the balance of resolve, this article analyzes the determinants of victory in nuclear crises. I first describe two analytically distinct mechanisms by which nuclear superiority may improve a state’s prospects for victory in nuclear crises. I then show that states that enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents are more likely to win nuclear crises. This relationship holds even after controlling for conventional military capabilities. Explanations that conceive of nuclear conflict as a competition in risk taking, and that therefore emphasize the balance of resolve, do not find support in the data. This article presents a new explanation of the advantages of nuclear superiority and the first comprehensive empirical examination of nuclear crisis outcomes.

Keywords: nuclear crisis, nuclear superiority, resolve, stakes, crisis outcome, victory