Can Bribes Buy Protection against International Competition?

Bjørnskov, Christian

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1452687

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Can Bribes Buy Protection against International Competition?

38 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2009

See all articles by Christian Bjørnskov

Christian Bjørnskov

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Center for Political Studies; Institute for Corruption Studies

Date Written: August 14, 2009

Abstract

This paper explores the association between corruption and trade policy. A theoretical framework first explores the effects of corruption on non-tariff barriers at the political and bureaucratic level. Relying on a panel of indices of corruption and non-tariff barriers from 1995, 2000 and 2005, estimates show that corruption tends to lead to higher non-tariff barriers. Further estimates are consistent with the theoretical considerations in suggesting that the effectiveness of corruption in buying barriers varies with the degree of press freedom.

Keywords: Trade Policy, Rent-seeking, Corruption

JEL Classification: F13, H25

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Bjørnskov, Christian, Can Bribes Buy Protection against International Competition? (August 14, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1452687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1452687