Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia

Posted: 18 Aug 2009

See all articles by Rui J. P. de Figueiredo

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael McFaul

Cornell University

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Abstract

All federal systems face the two fundamental dilemmas of federalism: too strong a center risks overawing the subnational units; and too weak a center risks free-riding that makes the system fall apart. Resolving the two dilemmas is problematic because mitigating one dilemma exacerbates the other. We develop a model of federal institutions that shows the circumstances under which both dilemmas can be solved so that federal institutions are self-enforcing. We apply our approach to modern Russia where we suggest that when the center is too strong, its ability to extract rents increases and the benefits for maintaining participation in the federal bargain disappears. We also suggest strong parallels between Russia and those of the early United States under the Articles of Confederation.

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, Rui J. P. and McFaul, Michael and Weingast, Barry R., Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 160-189, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1455583 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjm002

Rui J. P. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Michael McFaul

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

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