On the (Mis-) Use of Information for Public Debate
32 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2009 Last revised: 28 Aug 2016
Date Written: March 31, 2009
Abstract
Policymakers often motivate their decisions by disclosing information. While this can help hold the government to account, it may also give incumbents an incentive to 'fix the evidence' around their preferred policy. This paper studies how different disclosure rules and the degree of independence of government agencies affect citizen welfare when manipulation incentives are present. When both instruments can be chosen to maximize citizen welfare, secrecy is never socially optimal because its chief advantage - unbiased information - can more efficiently be achieved by insulating the agency from political pressure. And yet granting independence to the agency is not necessarily in the citizens' interest. For given evidence, in fact, biased information makes the government more reluctant to implement its ex ante preferred policy, thus mitigating the agency conflict between the government and the public. The model therefore highlights a novel drawback of bureaucratic independence.
Keywords: open government, accountability, independence, manipulation of information
JEL Classification: D73, H11, H56
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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