Co-Insurance in Mutual Fund Families

43 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2009 Last revised: 10 Dec 2013

Luis Goncalves-Pinto

National University of Singapore

Breno Schmidt

Emory University - Goizueta Business School

Date Written: December 9, 2013


We show that fire sales by distressed funds are systematically offset by purchases of other funds in the same family. Our results suggest that these off-exchange trades are mainly the outcome of coordinated strategies at the fund manager level. This type of co-insurance is more likely when (i) there is reciprocity in repeated interactions, (ii) the same manager oversees the funds on both sides of the transaction, and (iii) the distressed fund holds more illiquid assets. Overall, co-insurance diminishes the price impact of widespread selling by distressed funds, and helps illiquid funds pay a lower cost of distress.

Keywords: Mutual Fund Families, Internal Capital Markets, Asset Fire Sales, Price Impact, Stock Liquidity, Managerial Incentives, Co-Insurance, Implicit Contracts

JEL Classification: G11, G23, G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Goncalves-Pinto, Luis and Schmidt, Breno, Co-Insurance in Mutual Fund Families (December 9, 2013). Available at SSRN: or

Luis Goncalves-Pinto (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore ( email )

Mochtar Riady Building
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 119245


Breno Schmidt

Emory University - Goizueta Business School ( email )

1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322-2722
United States

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