39 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2009
Date Written: August 16, 2009
We examine quantitatively why uniform vouchers have repeatedly suffered electoral defeats against the current system where public and private schools coexist. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not suficiently valuable for the poorer households to prefer the uniform vouchers to the current mix of public and private education. We then develop a model of publicly funded means-tested education vouchers where the voucher received by each household is a linearly decreasing function of income. Public policy, which is determined by majority voting, consists of two dimensions: the overall funding level (or the tax rate) and the slope of the means testing function. We solve the model when the political decisions are sequential-households vote first on the tax rate and then on the extent of means testing. We establish that a majority voting equilibrium exists. We show that the means-tested voucher regime is majority preferred to the status-quo. These results are robust to alternative preference parameters, income distribution parameters and voter turnout.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Glomm, Gerhard and Bearse, Peter and Cardak, Buly A. and Ravikumar, B., Why Do Education Vouchers Fail? (August 16, 2009). CAEPR Working Paper No. 014-2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1456391 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456391