Revisiting Political Budget Cycles in Latin America

52 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2009 Last revised: 24 Aug 2009

See all articles by Sebastián Nieto Parra

Sebastián Nieto Parra

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Javier Santiso

ESADE Business School

Date Written: August 1, 2009

Abstract

In this paper we test the impact of elections on fiscal policy in Latin American economies in comparison to OECD countries over the period 1990-2006. We find that in Latin American countries, the average primary balance declines by an amount close to 0.7 per cent of GDP during an election year, confirming the hypothesis of fiscal deteriorations during the election cycle. Most of this movement is due to the expenditure component and within this it is current (close to 0.8 per cent of GDP) rather than capital expenditure that is most affected. By contrast, in OECD countries, the observed changes in the primary balance and current expenditures during election years are minimal. Our analysis also suggests that re-elections of incumbent candidates in Latin America have a considerable impact on the expenditure side of the fiscal balance.

Finally, by comparing the 2005-2006 electoral cycle with respect to prior electoral cycles, we note a slight improvement of fiscal management around elections in the region. We derive policy implications and recommendations from our findings.

Keywords: Political budget cycle, elections, incumbent candidates, Latin America

JEL Classification: D72, E62, H62, P16

Suggested Citation

Nieto Parra, Sebastián and Santiso, Javier, Revisiting Political Budget Cycles in Latin America (August 1, 2009). OECD Working Paper No. 281, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1456845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456845

Sebastián Nieto Parra

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris, 75775
France

Javier Santiso (Contact Author)

ESADE Business School ( email )

Mateo Inurria 27
Madrid, 28036
Spain

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