Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics as Determinants of CEO Turnover in French-Listed Companies
Finance, Volume 32, No. 2, December 2011, pages 53-89
32 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2009 Last revised: 27 Mar 2015
Date Written: April 16, 2011
Abstract
This paper investigates whether ownership structure and board characteristics determine CEO turnover in a sample of largest French-listed firms from 1994 to 2001. The results show that CEO turnover is negatively and significantly related to prior accounting and stock performance. Controlling for prior performance, ownership structure, and characteristics of boards of directors impacts the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance. Firms with blockholders, high government ownership, two-tier boards, and larger boards are less likely to dismiss CEOs for poor performance. Institutional investors, and their co-existence with large blockholders, do not impact the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance.
Keywords: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity, Ownership Structure, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: G3, G30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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