Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics as Determinants of CEO Turnover in French-Listed Companies

Finance, Volume 32, No. 2, December 2011, pages 53-89

32 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2009 Last revised: 27 Mar 2015

See all articles by Bang Dang Nguyen

Bang Dang Nguyen

University of Cambridge Judge Business School

Date Written: April 16, 2011

Abstract

This paper investigates whether ownership structure and board characteristics determine CEO turnover in a sample of largest French-listed firms from 1994 to 2001. The results show that CEO turnover is negatively and significantly related to prior accounting and stock performance. Controlling for prior performance, ownership structure, and characteristics of boards of directors impacts the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance. Firms with blockholders, high government ownership, two-tier boards, and larger boards are less likely to dismiss CEOs for poor performance. Institutional investors, and their co-existence with large blockholders, do not impact the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance.

Keywords: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity, Ownership Structure, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G3, G30

Suggested Citation

Nguyen, Bang Dang, Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics as Determinants of CEO Turnover in French-Listed Companies (April 16, 2011). Finance, Volume 32, No. 2, December 2011, pages 53-89. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1456851 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456851

Bang Dang Nguyen (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+44 122 376 0470 (Phone)
+44 1223 339701 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/research/faculty/nguyenbd.html

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
296
Abstract Views
1,870
rank
104,885
PlumX Metrics