Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism

UCSD Economics Discussion Paper No. 98-17

19 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 1999

See all articles by Joel Sobel

Joel Sobel

University of California at San Diego

Date Written: July 1998

Abstract

Given n agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. It is shown that any constrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is a Nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game. Conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes.

JEL Classification: C7, D5, D7

Suggested Citation

Sobel, Joel, Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism (July 1998). UCSD Economics Discussion Paper No. 98-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=145788 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.145788

Joel Sobel (Contact Author)

University of California at San Diego ( email )

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