Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link

32 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2009  

Daniel G. Arce

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Economics & Finance

Dan Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2009

Abstract

In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.

Keywords: conflict, suicide terrorism, weakest link, Colonel Blotto

JEL Classification: C70, D74

Suggested Citation

Arce, Daniel G. and Kovenock, Dan and Roberson, Brian, Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link (August 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2753. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1458851

Daniel G. Arce

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Richardson, TX 75083
United States

Daniel Kovenock

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Brian Roberson (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
173
Rank
81,086
Abstract Views
1,359