Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for Undocumented Workers

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2009-14c

48 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2010

See all articles by Julie L. Hotchkiss

Julie L. Hotchkiss

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Georgia State University - Department of Economics

Myriam Quispe-Agnoli

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

Using matched employer-employee data from the state of Georgia, this paper investigates the potential for employer monopsony power in the labor market for undocumented workers. Undocumented workers are found to be about 40 percent less sensitive as documented workers to their employers’ wage adjustments. This difference in labor supply elasticities accounts for about 30 percent of the observed within-firm wage differential between documented and undocumented workers. There is no statistically significant evidence of displacement of documented workers as more undocumented workers are hired.

Keywords: labor demand, monopsony, illegal immigration, undocumented workers

JEL Classification: J42, J61, J2

Suggested Citation

Hotchkiss, Julie L. and Quispe-Agnoli, Myriam, Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for Undocumented Workers (December 1, 2009). Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2009-14c. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1459045 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1459045

Julie L. Hotchkiss (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )

Research Department
1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404-498-8198 (Phone)
404-498-8058 (Fax)

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States

Myriam Quispe-Agnoli

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )

1000 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404-498-8930 (Phone)
404-498-8956 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
116
Abstract Views
923
rank
251,098
PlumX Metrics