Conflict of Interest and Certification in the U.S. IPO Market
33 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2009
Date Written: March 29, 2009
We examine the long-term return performance of U.S. IPOs underwritten by relationship banks. We show that, over one- to three-year horizons, IPOs managed by relationship banks experience buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns that are similar to those observed for a matching sample of stocks managed by non-relationship underwriters. This result holds even when the returns' skewness and cross-sectional correlation is accounted for. Further, we examine the calendar-time returns on a portfolio that is long the stocks underwritten by relationship banks and short ex-ante similar stocks taken public by non-relationship institutions. Again, we conclude that the two groups of IPOs yield similar long-run returns. These findings support the certification role of relationship banks and suggest that, in this respect, the effect of the 1999 repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act has not been negative.
Keywords: Glass-Steagall Act, IPOs, Certification, Conflict of Interest, Lending Relationships
JEL Classification: G20, G30, G24, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation