Deception and Political Participation: Theory and Laboratory Evidence

80 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2009 Last revised: 23 Oct 2013

See all articles by Daniel Houser

Daniel Houser

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Sandra Ludwig

Ulm University

Thomas Stratmann

George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy; George Mason University - Mercatus Center; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: August 2013

Abstract

We model two-candidate elections in which 1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and 2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare political campaigns with truthful advertising to campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in-line with an advertisement’s information. We test our model’s predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of an even small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low-quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions.

Keywords: voter information, turnout, participation in elections, campaign finance, deceptive advertising

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D72

Suggested Citation

Houser, Daniel and Ludwig, Sandra and Stratmann, Thomas, Deception and Political Participation: Theory and Laboratory Evidence (August 2013). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 12-27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1460940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1460940

Daniel Houser

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science ( email )

5th Floor, Vernon Smith Hall
George Mason University
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
7039934856 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~dhouser/

Sandra Ludwig

Ulm University ( email )

Ulm University
Helmholtzstrasse 18
Ulm, Baden-Württemberg 89081
Germany

Thomas Stratmann (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2330 (Phone)

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mercatus.org/scholars/thomas-stratmann

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
258
Abstract Views
3,247
Rank
235,637
PlumX Metrics