To Pay or Not to Pay: Managerial Decision Making and Wage Withholding in Russia

Columbia University Discussion Paper No. 9899-04

21 Pages Posted: 3 May 1999

See all articles by Padma Desai

Padma Desai

Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA)

Todd Idson

Boston University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1998

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the decisions of Russian managers in distributing wage non-payment in Russia during the 1994-96 period. Using a longitudinal survey of households, we identify a pattern of wage arrears across regions and industries which suggests that managers allocated non-payment among workers so as to minimize the real wage declines experienced by higher productivity workers. This finding suggests that post-Soviet managers were responding more strongly to market incentives than to equity considerations in their wage withholding allocation decisions.

JEL Classification: J3, P3

Suggested Citation

Desai, Padma and Idson, Todd, To Pay or Not to Pay: Managerial Decision Making and Wage Withholding in Russia (October 1998). Columbia University Discussion Paper No. 9899-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=146190 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146190

Padma Desai (Contact Author)

Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/RESEARCH/pd5.html

Todd Idson

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States

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