Justice and Finance Committees' Joint Hearing on the Italian Corporate Law Reform, Italian Chamber of Deputies, November 27, 2002 (Audizione Dinanzi Alle Commissioni Giustizia E Finanze Riunite in Tema Di Riforma Del Diritto Societario)

17 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2009 Last revised: 23 Sep 2009

See all articles by Luca Enriques

Luca Enriques

University of Oxford Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: November 27, 2002

Abstract

This document is the written testimony submitted to the Italian Chamber of Deputies Justice and Finances Committees for their joint hearing on the Italian corporate law reform, held November 27, 2002. The hearing took place after the Government had issued a first draft legislative decree implementing the Parliament's mandate to reform Italian corporate law. The testimony calls for a more flexible regime especially for non-listed corporations and suggests to amend the Government's draft so as to grant more leeway to contractual freedom. Suggestions cover, inter alia, the following issues: shareholder agreements, limits on deviations from one-share-one-vote, legal capital rules, general meetings, self-dealing, liability suits, and corporate groups.

Note: Downloadable document is in Italian.

Keywords: Italian corporate law reform

JEL Classification: G38

Suggested Citation

Enriques, Luca, Justice and Finance Committees' Joint Hearing on the Italian Corporate Law Reform, Italian Chamber of Deputies, November 27, 2002 (Audizione Dinanzi Alle Commissioni Giustizia E Finanze Riunite in Tema Di Riforma Del Diritto Societario) (November 27, 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1463255 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1463255

Luca Enriques (Contact Author)

University of Oxford Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

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