Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment

17 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2009 Last revised: 24 Oct 2009

See all articles by Alessandro Innocenti

Alessandro Innocenti

University of Siena - Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences; University of Siena - Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory

Antonio Nicita

University of Siena - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 30, 2009

Abstract

In this paper we compare - in the laboratory - stoppage and virtual strike. Our experiment confirms that higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. The number of strikes, the level of efforts and average total payoffs are higher under virtual strike than under standard strike. However, when standard strike is associated with reciprocal externalities, it induces higher effort levels, higher payoffs and an extremely reduced number of strikes than virtual strike. It is unclear whether this behavior reflects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. However our results might explain why standard strikes rather than virtual ones are generally adopted by workers.

Keywords: virtual strike, cooperation, reciprocity, fairness, experiments

JEL Classification: C91, D74, D78, J52, K31, M55

Suggested Citation

Innocenti, Alessandro and Nicita, Antonio, Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment (August 30, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1464308 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1464308

Alessandro Innocenti (Contact Author)

University of Siena - Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences ( email )

Via Roma 56
Siena, Siena I-53100
Italy
39 338 5724318 (Phone)
39 0577 232793 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.labsi.org/innocenti/

University of Siena - Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory ( email )

Piazza Mattioli 10
Siena, Siena 53100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.labsi.org

Antonio Nicita

University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza S. Francesco, 7
Siena, I-53100
Italy

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
31
Abstract Views
462
PlumX Metrics