The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages

35 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 1999

See all articles by Joseph S. Tracy

Joseph S. Tracy

Federal Reserve Bank of New York; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Peter Cramton

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Morley Gunderson

University of Toronto - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1998

Abstract

Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to March 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions.

JEL Classification: D82, J52, J58

Suggested Citation

Tracy, Joseph and Cramton, Peter C. and Gunderson, Morley, The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages (November 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=146432 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146432

Joseph Tracy (Contact Author)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Peter C. Cramton

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

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Morley Gunderson

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

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416-978-5696 (Fax)

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