Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap

29 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 1999

See all articles by Ronel Elul

Ronel Elul

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

José Silva Reus

Universidad de Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis

Oscar Volij

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 1998

Abstract

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the gender wage gap. The difference in earnings is a consequence of a demographic regularity--that men tend to marry younger women--which limits women's labor mobility. However, couples are always free not to marry, and do so only if it is in each's self-interest.

In our model, marriage is beneficial because the joint consumption is a household public good. The intrafamily allocation of resources is determined via noncooperative bargaining; this leads to interesting interactions between the game played by husband and wife on the one hand, and the competitive environment in which they are immersed on the other. One example of this is the gender gap.

JEL Classification: J12, J16

Suggested Citation

Elul, Ronel and Silva Reus, José Angel and Volij, Oscar, Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap (May 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=146728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146728

Ronel Elul (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )

Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States
215-574-3965 (Phone)

José Angel Silva Reus

Universidad de Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis ( email )

03080 Alicante
Spain
+34 96 590 3400 x 3254 (Phone)
+34 96 590 3898 (Fax)

Oscar Volij

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel

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