On the Evidence of a Working Spouse Penalty in the Managerial Labor Market

Posted: 11 May 1999

See all articles by Julie L. Hotchkiss

Julie L. Hotchkiss

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Georgia State University - Department of Economics

Robert Elijah Moore

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Abstract

This analysis of March 1993 Current Population Survey data suggests that managers with working wives earn lower wages than their counterparts with non-working wives. The labor supply decisions of managers' wives appear to be unaffected by (that is, "exogenous" with respect to) their husbands' wages. In contrast, there is evidence that the labor supply decisions of non-managers' wives are affected by their husbands' wages, and when the analysis takes account of that endogeneity, it is found that non-managers do not suffer a working spouse penalty. The analysis also highlights some important issues related to the use of instrumental variables.

JEL Classification: J12, J22, J31

Suggested Citation

Hotchkiss, Julie L. and Moore, Robert Elijah, On the Evidence of a Working Spouse Penalty in the Managerial Labor Market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=146839

Julie L. Hotchkiss (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )

Research Department
1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404-498-8198 (Phone)
404-498-8058 (Fax)

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States

Robert Elijah Moore

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States
404-651-3756 (Phone)
404-651-4985 (Fax)

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