Normative Institutionalism and EU Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

International Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 491-504, July 2009

14 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2009 Last revised: 2 Feb 2010

See all articles by Frank Schimmelfennig

Frank Schimmelfennig

ETH Zürich

Daniel C. Thomas

Leiden University, Institute of Political Science

Date Written: July 1, 2009

Abstract

Normative Institutionalism has proven to be a robust theory of EU decision-making on foreign policy and external relations whose entrapment and cooperative bargaining explanations for the policy-making process and outcome are generally (though not universally) superior to those of competing theories. This conclusion emerges from 14 case studies across a broad range of policy areas and institutional settings, all of which exhibited clear differences in the initial policy preferences of member states. Only two of the cases offered clear support for Intergovernmentalism’s competitive bargaining hypothesis, while none of the case studies conforms to either the normative suasion or policy learning hypotheses, which posit distinctive mechanisms of policy agreement based on preference convergence. Cross-case analysis identifies the relative importance of five conditions hypothesized to affect the likelihood of entrapment and cooperative bargaining: determinacy, relevance, publicity, precedent and forum. Finally, we discuss the implications of this special issue for future research and for EU policy-making.

Keywords: European Union, foreign policy, CFSP, negotiation, institutionalism

Suggested Citation

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Thomas, Daniel C., Normative Institutionalism and EU Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (July 1, 2009). International Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 491-504, July 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1468407

Frank Schimmelfennig

ETH Zürich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
8092 Zurich, CH-1015
Switzerland

Daniel C. Thomas (Contact Author)

Leiden University, Institute of Political Science ( email )

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences
PO Box 9555
Leiden, 2300 RB
Netherlands

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