Reference Point Effects in Antisocial Preferences

11 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2009

See all articles by Klaus Abbink

Klaus Abbink

University of East Anglia

David Masclet

Université de Rennes I; M@rsouin

Matthijs van Veelen

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: September 4, 2009

Abstract

We study antisocial preferences in simple money-burning tasks. A decision maker can choose whether or not to reduce another person’s payoff at an own cost. We vary across tasks the initial endowment of the decider and the victim. We find that most conventional expectations are refuted: Subjects burn more when inequality is advantageous than when it is disadvantageous. Equitable distributions are particularly prone to destruction. These effects are reversed, however, when the equivalent tasks are framed as creation instead of destruction.

Keywords: other-regarding preferences, antisocial behaviour, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C72, C90, D82

Suggested Citation

Abbink, Klaus and Masclet, David and van Veelen, Matthijs, Reference Point Effects in Antisocial Preferences (September 4, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1468567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1468567

Klaus Abbink (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
+441603593275 (Phone)
+441603456259 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uea.ac.uk

David Masclet

Université de Rennes I ( email )

11 Rue Jean Macé
35065 Rennes Cedex, Rennes
France

M@rsouin ( email )

France

Matthijs Van Veelen

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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