Does the Right to Property Create a Constitutional Tension in Socialist Constitutions? An Analysis with Reference to India and China

Abstract

This paper seeks to investigate the constitutional tension that the right to property could create in socialist constitutions. An investigation into this constitutional tension - which acquires an additional dimension when socialist constitutions are injected with the free market ideology - is carried out with reference to India and China, the two states which have embraced a free market economy, but without expressly or totally discarding the socialist orientation of their respective constitutions.

An attempt will be made to compare the model of constitutional socialism adopted by India and China and how that model has been modified in view of the policies of economic liberalisation. Against this background, the approaches taken by India and China vis-à-vis the constitutional protection of the right to property will be contrasted. I argue that although China might not witness the constitutional tension experienced by India, one may already notice a few signs of emerging contradictions inherent in protecting the right to property and at the same time implementing socialist policies. It may, therefore, be useful for China to refer to the Indian experience concerning the constitutional protection to the right to property.

Keywords: Right to property, Indian Constitution, PRC Constitution, Constitutional socialism, comparative constitutional law