Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy

Abstract

This article is concerned with an examination of the rights and responsibilities of those individuals having what psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, and psychologists call psychopathic, sociopathic, or antisocial personalities. It invokes a Kantian theme, however, because in coming to terms with the concept of psycopathy, one is also forced to come to terms with the question of what it is to be a person with dignity and thereby meriting that special kind of respect which is entailed by a moral commitment to justice rather than mere utility. While the author first addressed this issue in his book Kant: The Philosophy of Right, this article expands further on this issue and constitutes a significant rejection of that book’s arguments. While, in the book, the author argued that it is a capacity to choose and not moral autonomy which confers dignity or worth upon persons, this article reverses that position and argues that it is moral autonomy and not capacity to choose which confers dignity or worthy on persons. No one had articulated a theoretical defense for this position, however, and this article attempts to fill that theoretical gap.

Keywords: Psychopathic, Sociopathic, Antisocial Personalities, Immanuel Kant, Human Personhood