Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction
7 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2009 Last revised: 31 Oct 2017
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Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction
Economics Letters, Vol. 108, 210
Number of pages: 7
Posted: 09 Sep 2009
Last Revised: 31 Oct 2017
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Signal Jamming in a Sequential Auction
Economics Letters, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2010
Posted: 19 May 2010
Last Revised: 08 Nov 2022
Date Written: April 7, 2009
Abstract
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
Keywords: Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition
JEL Classification: D44, D02, D43
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ding, Wei and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction (April 7, 2009). Economics Letters, Vol. 108, 210, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1469745
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