Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

7 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2009 Last revised: 21 Jun 2012

Wei Ding

University of Bonn - The Bonn Graduate School of Economics

Thomas D. Jeitschko

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Elmar Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Date Written: April 7, 2009

Abstract

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

Keywords: Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition

JEL Classification: D44, D02, D43

Suggested Citation

Ding, Wei and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Wolfstetter, Elmar, Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction (April 7, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1469745

Wei Ding

University of Bonn - The Bonn Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Adenauerallee 24-26
Bonn, D-53113
Germany

Thomas D. Jeitschko

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/

Elmar G. Wolfstetter (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/vwl/microeconomics/people/ewolfstetter

Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )

Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea

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