A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games

A LONG-RUN COLLABORATION ON LONG-RUN GAMES, Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine, eds., World Scientific Publishing Co., December 2008

15 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2009

See all articles by Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Date Written: December 12, 2008

Abstract

This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.

Keywords: Long-Run Players, Limit Games, Robustness, Equilibrium, Reputation Effects, Repeated Games

Suggested Citation

Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K., A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games (December 12, 2008). A LONG-RUN COLLABORATION ON LONG-RUN GAMES, Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine, eds., World Scientific Publishing Co., December 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1470577

Drew Fudenberg (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

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