Footnotes (58)



Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights

Horacio Spector

University of San Diego School of Law; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella


San Diego Law Journal, Forthcoming

Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of 'rights,' both moral and legal. The 'Will Theory' and the 'Interest Theory' - the two main views - can each account for various features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory. The controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable. I will contend in this paper that the discussion of 'value pluralism' in the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept of rights.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Value Pluralism, Rights

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Date posted: September 17, 2009 ; Last revised: January 27, 2010

Suggested Citation

Spector, Horacio, Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights (2009). San Diego Law Journal, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1474806

Contact Information

Horacio Spector (Contact Author)
University of San Diego School of Law ( email )
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella ( email )
Buenos Aires
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