Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement

Daniel A. Crane

University of Michigan Law School

September 17, 2009

Vanderbilt Law Review, Forthcoming
University of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 164
U of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 09-021

Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and legal judgment day is usually so long that the corporate managers responsible for the planning have left their corporate employer before the employer internalizes the cost of the violation. Private litigation needs to be entirely reconceptualized and redirected toward a forward-looking, problem-solving approach to market power issues.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: private litigation

JEL Classification: K21

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Date posted: September 19, 2009 ; Last revised: October 8, 2009

Suggested Citation

Crane, Daniel A., Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement (September 17, 2009). Vanderbilt Law Review, Forthcoming; University of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 164; U of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 09-021. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1474956

Contact Information

Daniel A. Crane (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-2622 (Phone)

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