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Centralized Clearing for Over-the-Counter Derivatives

50 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2009  

Gordon C. Rausser

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

William Balson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Reid B. Stevens

University of California, Berkeley

Date Written: September 18, 2009

Abstract

Systemic risk propagated through over-the-counter derivatives can best be managed by a public-private central counterparty clearing house (CCP). Though private CCPs provide an adequate amount of clearing’s private good, they do not provide the socially optimal level of the public good or impure goods. By undersupplying both public and impure goods, private CCPs may exacerbate the conditions under which financial crises develop and propagate. A public-private partnership could align incentives so that the CCP produces the socially optimal level of the private, public, and impure goods. A partnership using a two-part pricing scheme for OTC structured composite transactions could properly compensate both partners and provide an effective policy instrument for controlling systemic risk. Moreover this structure, in contrast to current proposed government regulations, will not drive out the “good” with the “bad” OTC derivative instruments.

Keywords: centralized clearing, OTC derivates, permissioning, systemic risk

JEL Classification: G12, G13, G18

Suggested Citation

Rausser, Gordon C. and Balson, William and Stevens, Reid B., Centralized Clearing for Over-the-Counter Derivatives (September 18, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1475351 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1475351

Gordon C. Rausser (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

207 Giannini Hall no. 3310
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-6591 (Phone)
510-643-0287 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://are.berkeley.edu/~rausser/

Bill Balson

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Reid Stevens

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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