Laboratory Incentive Structure and Control-Test Design in an Experimental Asset Market

Posted: 21 Sep 2009

See all articles by Olivier Brandouy

Olivier Brandouy

University of Angers - Groupe de Recherche en Économie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Date Written: October 16, 2000

Abstract

This paper presents the results of a series of experiments in a simulated double-auction stock market driven by orders. It is shown that two small groups of traders should adopt a similar behavior when subjected to identical stimuli in the laboratory. To achieve this homogenous behavior, it is necessary to propose an incentive structure according to the rules of the Induced Value Theory proposed by Smith. The data collected in this experiment clearly show, after a series of co-integration tests and non-parametric tests, that experimental protocols of `control-test' design should be successfully used in experimental finance.

Keywords: Induced value theory, Behavior, Double-auction, Design of experiment, Experimental asset market, Test-reference protocol

JEL Classification: C92, B40

Suggested Citation

Brandouy, Olivier, Laboratory Incentive Structure and Control-Test Design in an Experimental Asset Market (October 16, 2000). Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 22, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1475408

Olivier Brandouy (Contact Author)

University of Angers - Groupe de Recherche en Économie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA) ( email )

Avenue Léon Duguit
Aveneu Duguit
Pessac, 33 608
France

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
294
PlumX Metrics