Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation
Brown University Economics Working Paper Series
23 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2009
Date Written: September 21, 2009
Abstract
We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It is shown that, in economic environments with at least three agents, mixed Bayesian implementation is equivalent to mixed Bayesian monotonicity, incentive compatibility and closure. For implementing a social choice function, the case of two-agents is also covered by these conditions and mixed Bayesian monotonicity reduces to Bayesian monotonicity. Following parallel steps, mixed virtual implementation is shown to be equivalent to mixed virtual monotonicity, incentive compatibility and closure. The key condition, mixed virtual monotonicity, is argued to be very weak. In particular, it is weaker than Abreu-Matsushima’s measurability, thereby implying that: (1) virtual implementation in mixed Bayesian equilibrium is more permissive than virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies, and (2) non-regular mechanisms are essential for the implementation of rules in that gap.
Keywords: Exact implementation, approximate implementation, incomplete information
JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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