An Experimental Study of Jury Deliberation

33 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2009

See all articles by Jacob K. Goeree

Jacob K. Goeree

University of Zurich

Leeat Yariv

Princeton University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: September 14, 2009

Abstract

We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds majority, and unanimity). When deliberation is prohibited, different institutions generate significantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation, however, significantly diminishes institutional differences and uniformly improves efficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an array of stable attributes: messages are public, consistently reveal private information, provide a good predictor for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous) sequencing.

Keywords: Jury Decision Making, Deliberative Voting, Strategic Voting

JEL Classification: C92, D02, D72

Suggested Citation

Goeree, Jacob K. and Yariv, Leeat, An Experimental Study of Jury Deliberation (September 14, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1476567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1476567

Jacob K. Goeree

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/jgoeree.html

Leeat Yariv (Contact Author)

Princeton University ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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