The Dynamics of Capital Market Governance

PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, Imperial College Press, 2007

17 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2009

See all articles by Justin O’Brien

Justin O’Brien

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics; University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Date Written: December 3, 2007

Abstract

Global capital markets are in a state of flux. Castigated in the past as "Barbarians at the Gate", private equity providers are once again proclaiming the end of the public corporation. This important book addresses the implications of private equity for the governance of corporations, the capital markets in which they operate and the professionals who provide corporate advisory services.

The book evaluates and ranks the precise nature of the risk posed by private equity by situating it within an overarching analysis of the dynamics of financial capitalism. Key issues addressed include: the management of conflicts of interest, fiduciary duties, the role of enforcement, the efficacy of adopting a rules- or principles-based system of regulation, the form and function of compliance, and a detailed examination of how to embed accountability into an integrity system for the financial markets. The book therefore has enormous benefit for industry, regulatory and academic communities alike.

Keywords: Private Equity, Conflicts of Interest, Financial Regulation, Enforcement, Investment Banks, Fiduciary Duties

Suggested Citation

O’Brien, Justin, The Dynamics of Capital Market Governance (December 3, 2007). PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, Imperial College Press, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1478308

Justin O’Brien (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

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