Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
Posted: 28 Sep 2009
There are 4 versions of this paper
Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
Number of pages: 46
Posted: 15 Sep 2005
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706
Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
NYU Working Paper No. S-FI-05-02
Number of pages: 58
Posted: 11 Nov 2008
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79
Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
NYU Working Paper No. FIN-07-029
Number of pages: 46
Posted: 13 Nov 2008
Downloads
71
Date Written: October 2009
Abstract
We show that relatively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments for securities offerings. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase the banks’ chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships.
Keywords: G21, G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ljungqvist, Alexander and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Marston, Felicia C. and Wilhelm, William J., Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments (October 2009). The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 10, pp. 3977-4007, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1479104 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn106
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