Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments

Posted: 28 Sep 2009

See all articles by Alexander Ljungqvist

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swedish House of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Felicia C. Marston

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

William J. Wilhelm

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2009

Abstract

We show that relatively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments for securities offerings. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase the banks’ chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships.

Keywords: G21, G24

Suggested Citation

Ljungqvist, Alexander and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Marston, Felicia C. and Wilhelm, William J., Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments (October 2009). The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 10, pp. 3977-4007, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1479104 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn106

Alexander Ljungqvist (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Felicia C. Marston

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )

P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States
804-924-1417 (Phone)

William J. Wilhelm

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )

Rouss & Robertson Halls, East Lawn
P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States
434-924-7666 (Phone)
434-924-7074 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://gates.comm.virginia.edu/wjw9a/

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