Optimal Regulation of Auditing

Posted: 28 Sep 2009

See all articles by Marco Pagano

Marco Pagano

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

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Abstract

We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and it is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model can encompass collusion between clients and auditors, arising from the joint provision of auditing and consulting services: deflecting collusion requires less ambitious standards. Finally, banning the provision of consulting services by auditors eliminates collusion but may not be optimal in the presence of economies of scope. (JEL Classification: G28, K22, M42).

Keywords: auditing, regulation, enforcement, collusion.

Suggested Citation

Pagano, Marco and Immordino, Giovanni, Optimal Regulation of Auditing. CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 363-388, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1479136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifm016

Marco Pagano (Contact Author)

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)

Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy

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