Endogenous Spillovers and Incentives to Innovate

18 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 1999

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Armin Schmutzler

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: January 1999

Abstract

We present a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. Firms choose continuous levels of a cost-reducing innovation before they engage in competition for each other's R&D-employees. Successful bids for the competitor's employee then result in higher levels of cost-reduction. Finally, firms enter product market competition. We apply the approach to the long-standing debate on the effects of the mode of competition on innovation incentives. We show that incentives to acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to prevent spillovers are weaker under quantity competition than under price competition. As a result, for a wide range of parameters, price competition gives stronger innovation incentives than quantity competition.

JEL Classification: L11, O31

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans and Schmutzler, Armin, Endogenous Spillovers and Incentives to Innovate (January 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=147917 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.147917

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Armin Schmutzler

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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