Journal of Accounting and Economics, Volume 58, Issue 1, August 2014, Pages 96–116
Posted: 24 Nov 2014 Last revised: 18 Sep 2015
Date Written: May 1, 2014
Knowledge is central to managing an organization, but its presence in employees is difficult to measure directly. We hypothesize that external communication patterns reveal the location of knowledge within the management team. Using a large database of firm conference call transcripts, we find that CEOs speak less in settings where they are likely to be relatively less knowledgeable. CEOs who speak more are also paid more, and firms whose CEO pay is not commensurate with CEO speaking have a lower industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Communication thus appears to reveal knowledge.
Keywords: knowledge, communication, firm value, compensation, authority, organization
JEL Classification: D22, D70, D80, L23, M12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Li, Feng and Minnis, Michael and Nagar, Venky and Rajan, Madhav V., Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication (May 1, 2014). Journal of Accounting and Economics, Volume 58, Issue 1, August 2014, Pages 96–116; Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-03; Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 83. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1480670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1480670