Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, Government by Deal and the Private Equity Implosion

GODS AT WAR, Chapter 1, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

24 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2009  

Steven Davidoff Solomon

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy

Date Written: October 5, 2009

Abstract

Gods at War is about the factors that drive and sustain deal-making, particularly mergers and acquisitions. Gods at War examines these issues through a history of deal-making in the sixth takeover wave and thereafter in the financial crisis. It is about the private equity boom and its implosion, return of the strategic transaction and hostile takeover, material adverse change wars of 2007, failure of the investment banking model, emergence of sovereign wealth funds, government deal-making during the financial crisis, and revolution occurring in the capital markets during this time. Gods at War details how capital market participants construct deals, with a particular focus on the intricacies of deal-making’s legal aspects and deal theory, while placing this deal-making in economic and recent historical context. The downloadable paper includes the Table of Contents and the First Chapter of Gods at War.

Keywords: takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, private equity, hedge funds, strategic takeovers, hostile takeovers, corporations, shareholder activism, sovereign wealth funds, foreign investment, deals, deal-theory, distressed takeovers, financial crisis, regulation by deal

Suggested Citation

Davidoff Solomon, Steven, Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, Government by Deal and the Private Equity Implosion (October 5, 2009). GODS AT WAR, Chapter 1, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1481403

Steven Davidoff Solomon (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720-7200

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