Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation

27 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2009 Last revised: 6 Oct 2009

See all articles by Harry DeAngelo

Harry DeAngelo

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Date Written: March 1, 1980

Abstract

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms’ capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.

Keywords: Capital Structure, Corporate Taxes, Personal Taxes, Bankruptcy Costs, Non-debt Tax Shields, Leverage

JEL Classification: G32, G33, D21, H25

Suggested Citation

DeAngelo, Harry and Masulis, Ronald W., Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation (March 1, 1980). Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 3-27, 1980, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1482270

Harry DeAngelo

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )

Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6541 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

Ronald W. Masulis (Contact Author)

University of New South Wales, Sydney ( email )

UNSW Business School
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
612-9385-5860 (Phone)
612-9385-6347 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

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