Does it Pay to Get an A? School Resource Allocations in Response to Accountability Ratings

47 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2009 Last revised: 22 Feb 2010

See all articles by Steven G. Craig

Steven G. Craig

University of Houston - Department of Economics

Scott A. Imberman

Michigan State University; Michigan State University - College of Education

Adam Perdue

University of Houston, Department of Economics

Date Written: January 8, 2010

Abstract

We examine whether public school districts and individual schools respond to accountability ratings by reallocating resources. Using data from Texas, we utilize three identification strategies - a regression discontinuity for schools on the rating boundaries, a “rating shock” analysis for schools that face a change in rating during the transition to a new accountability system, and a school fixed effects strategy. We find that under the early accountability system districts provided financial rewards for higher ratings. Spending increased for both instruction and ancillary expenditures. Under the later system, districts abandoned incentives and appeared to provide assistance to lower performing schools.

Keywords: education, accountability, school finance

JEL Classification: I22, I21, H72

Suggested Citation

Craig, Steven G. and Imberman, Scott Andrew and Perdue, Adam, Does it Pay to Get an A? School Resource Allocations in Response to Accountability Ratings (January 8, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1483295 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1483295

Steven G. Craig

University of Houston - Department of Economics ( email )

McElhinney Building
Room 202-A
Houston, TX 77204-5882
United States
713-743-3812 (Phone)
713-743-3798 (Fax)

Scott Andrew Imberman (Contact Author)

Michigan State University ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

Michigan State University - College of Education ( email )

East Lansing, MI
United States

Adam Perdue

University of Houston, Department of Economics ( email )

Houston, TX 77204-5882
United States

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