How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

11 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2009  

Pedro P. Barros

Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jo Seldeslachts

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: September 2009

Abstract

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L49

Suggested Citation

Barros, Pedro P. and Clougherty , Joseph A. and Seldeslachts, Jo, How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (September 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7454. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1484487

Pedro Luis Pita Barros

Universidade Nova de Lisboa ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal
+351 21 383 3624 (Phone)
+351 21 388 6073 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://ppbarros.fe.unl.pt

Joseph A. Clougherty (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 S. Sixth Street
350 Wohlers Hall, MC-706
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Jo Seldeslachts

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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