11 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2009
Date Written: September 2009
We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy
JEL Classification: K21, L40, L49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Barros, Pedro P. and Clougherty , Joseph A. and Seldeslachts, Jo, How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (September 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7454. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1484487
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