How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

11 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2009

See all articles by Pedro P. Barros

Pedro P. Barros

Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB); German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Date Written: September 2009

Abstract

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L49

Suggested Citation

Pita Barros, Pedro Luis and Clougherty, Joseph A. and Seldeslachts, Jo, How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (September 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7454. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1484487

Pedro Luis Pita Barros

Universidade Nova de Lisboa ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal
+351 21 383 3624 (Phone)
+351 21 388 6073 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://ppbarros.fe.unl.pt

Joseph A. Clougherty (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 S. Sixth Street
350 Wohlers Hall, MC-706
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

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