The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play: An Institutional Rational Choice Analysis

Posted: 9 Oct 2009

See all articles by Eduardo Araral

Eduardo Araral

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Date Written: October 2009

Abstract

Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma.

Suggested Citation

Araral, Eduardo, The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play: An Institutional Rational Choice Analysis (October 2009). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 19, Issue 4, pp. 853-871, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1484511 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun024

Eduardo Araral (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy ( email )

Singapore 117591
Singapore

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