Untangling the Web of Emotional Deceit: Measuring Strategic Use of Emotions in Negotiations

31 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2009 Last revised: 14 Aug 2011

See all articles by Emily T. Amanatullah

Emily T. Amanatullah

Georgetown University Women's Leadership Institute

Rebecca C. Levine

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Michael Morris

Columbia Business School - Management

Date Written: June 15, 2009

Abstract

This paper studies the emotion usage of negotiators, specifically the purposeful management of emotion suppression and expression as a strategic tool for shaping bargaining behavior and subsequent negotiation outcomes. We explore the strategic use of emotions in three ways, expressing truly felt emotions, hiding felt emotions, and feigning unfelt emotions. Using self-report transcript coding methods, we are able to accurately identify when and how negotiators managed emotional expression during the course of the negotiation and how such tactical manipulation of emotions influenced negotiated outcomes. We provide evidence using a simulated negotiation exercise of a monetary benefit to negotiators of using emotional deception as a bargaining tactic.

Suggested Citation

Amanatullah, Emily T. and Levine, Rebecca C. and Morris, Michael W., Untangling the Web of Emotional Deceit: Measuring Strategic Use of Emotions in Negotiations (June 15, 2009). 22nd Annual IACM Conference Paper; McCombs Research Paper Series No. MAN-02-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1484765 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1484765

Emily T. Amanatullah (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Women's Leadership Institute ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

Rebecca C. Levine

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Michael W. Morris

Columbia Business School - Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-2296 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.michaelwmorris.com

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