Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games

36 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2009

See all articles by Abigail Barr

Abigail Barr

University of Nottingham

Jean Ensminger

California Institute of Technology (Caltech)

Joe Henrich

University of British Columbia; Harvard University - Department of Human Evolutionary Biology

Chris Wallace

affiliation not provided to SSRN

H. Clark Barrette

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Alexander Bolyanatz

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Juan-Camilo Cárdenas

Universidad de Los Andes

Michael Gurven

Independent

Edwins Gwako

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Carolyn Lesorogol

Washington University in St. Louis - George Warren Brown School of Social Work

Frank Marlowe

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Richard McElreath

University of California, Davis

David Tracer

affiliation not provided to SSRN

John Ziker

Boise State University, Department of Anthropology

Date Written: March 8, 2009

Abstract

Data from three bargaining games - the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game - played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third- Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling.

Keywords: Bargaining Games, cross-cultural experiments, inequality aversion

JEL Classification: C72, C9, Z13

Suggested Citation

Barr, Abigail Margaret and Ensminger, Jean and Henrich, Joseph and Wallace, Chris and Barrette, H. Clark and Bolyanatz, Alexander and Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo and Gurven, Michael and Gwako, Edwins and Lesorogol, Carolyn and Marlowe, Frank and McElreath, Richard and Tracer, David and Ziker, John, Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games (March 8, 2009). Documento CEDE No. 2009-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1485862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1485862

Abigail Margaret Barr (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Jean Ensminger

California Institute of Technology (Caltech) ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Joseph Henrich

University of British Columbia ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada

Harvard University - Department of Human Evolutionary Biology ( email )

11 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Chris Wallace

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

H. Clark Barrette

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

Alexander Bolyanatz

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Juan-Camilo Cárdenas

Universidad de Los Andes ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia
339-4949 ext. 2473 (Phone)

Michael Gurven

Independent ( email )

Edwins Gwako

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Carolyn Lesorogol

Washington University in St. Louis - George Warren Brown School of Social Work ( email )

St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

Frank Marlowe

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Richard McElreath

University of California, Davis

One Shields Avenue
Apt 153
Davis, CA 95616
United States

David Tracer

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

John Ziker

Boise State University, Department of Anthropology ( email )

1910 University Drive
Boise, ID 83716
United States

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