Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

European Integration and National Courts - A Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behaviour

52 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2009  

Arthur Dyevre

KU Leuven

Date Written: October 9, 2009

Abstract

The present paper looks at the jurisprudence of national courts on the European law doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. Its central hypothesis is that national courts, supreme and constitutional courts in particular, try under the constraints of their institutional system to reconcile two conflicting goals: (1) the necessity to ensure the application and, hence, the supremacy of EU law on a daily basis as a direct and inevitable consequence of EU membership, and (2) the will to keep integration under control by preserving an at least hypothetical last word for the Member States and, thereby, the notion of national sovereignty. This hypothesis provides an explanation both for the overall equilibrium governing the relationship between the ECJ and national courts and for the variations in the way national judges have accommodated direct effect and EU law supremacy.

Keywords: European integration, law, national courts, neo-institutionalism

Suggested Citation

Dyevre, Arthur, European Integration and National Courts - A Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behaviour (October 9, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1486194 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486194

Arthur Dyevre (Contact Author)

KU Leuven ( email )

Tiensestraat 41
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Paper statistics

Downloads
208
Rank
124,761
Abstract Views
889