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The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers

Gillian E. Metzger

Columbia University - Law School

October 7, 2009

Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 09-213

This Essay, prepared as part of the Emory Law Journal’s 2009 Thrower Symposium on Executive Power, addresses internal separation of powers constraints on the executive branch. After briefly describing the form such constraints take and assessing their constitutional legitimacy, the Essay takes up the question of whether internal constraints can be an effective restraint on presidential aggrandizement. I argue that although such constraints can have some purchase, focusing solely on internal measures frames the inquiry too narrowly and ignores the important interdependent relationship between internal and external checks on executive power. The Essay concludes with an assessment of one such internal-external connection, the link between internal executive branch constraints and external legal doctrine, and suggests that separation of powers analysis should be more expressly used to reinforce such internal constraints.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

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Date posted: October 13, 2009 ; Last revised: November 2, 2009

Suggested Citation

Metzger, Gillian E., The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers (October 7, 2009). Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 09-213. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1486288 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486288

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Gillian E. Metzger (Contact Author)
Columbia University - Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
Jerome Greene Hall, Mailbox: C-11
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-2667 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

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