Accounting Discretion of Banks During a Financial Crisis

42 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2009

See all articles by Luc Laeven

Luc Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Harry Huizinga

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2009

Abstract

This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.

Keywords: Accounting, Asset management, Asset prices, Bank accounting, Bank regulations, Banks, Financial crisis, Housing prices, Investment, Liquidity management, Real estate prices

JEL Classification: G21, M40

Suggested Citation

Laeven, Luc A. and Huizinga, Harry, Accounting Discretion of Banks During a Financial Crisis (September 2009). IMF Working Paper No. 09/207, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1486525

Luc A. Laeven (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Harry Huizinga

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2623 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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